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Abstract 
There is growing attention in industry for the Vision Zero strategy, which in terms of work-
related health and safety is often labelled as Zero Accident Vision or Zero Harm. The 
consequences of a genuine commitment to Vision Zero for addressing health, safety and 
wellbeing and their synergies are discussed. The Vision Zero for work-related health, safety 
and wellbeing is defined as the assumption that all accidents, harm and diseases are 
preventable. Implementation of Vision Zero is a process - rather than a target, and healthy 
organisations make use of a wide range of options to facilitate this process. There is 
sufficient evidence that fatigue, stress, and work organisation factors are important 
determinants of safety behaviour and safety performance. Even with a focus on preventing 
accidents these additional factors should also be addressed. A relevant challenge is the 
integration of the Vision Zero into broader business policy and practice. There is a continued 
need more empirical research in this area. 
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1. Introduction 
The Zero Accident Vision (ZAV) is based on the assumption that all accidents are 
preventable. ZAV is then the ambition and commitment to create and ensure safe work and 
prevent all accidents in order to achieve safety excellence (Zwetsloot et al., 2017a, b). This is 
a high ambition and it sometimes gives rise to the misunderstanding that ZAV focuses on the 
‘goal’ of zero accidents, rather than on a ‘journey’ and a ‘process’ of creating safe work 
(safety excellence). Zwetsloot et al. (2013a) called for more (empirical) research into the 
practices and perspectives of such commitments for improving safety. They stated that ZAV 
was developed in industry, and needed more attention from safety researchers. In this paper 
we want to focus on the broader Vision Zero (VZ), which addresses not only safety but also 
(occupational) health and wellbeing, which is often associated with the Zero Harm (ZH) 
concept. We also focus on the challenges companies may face to keep ZAV or VZ ‘alive’ in 
the long run, also when the need to improve health, safety and wellbeing (HSW) seems less 
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urgent. The latter is closely related to the question of how to sustain VZ as part of the 
business strategy, in order to prevent it from becoming a new, broader occupational safety 
and health silo.  
 
The expression ‘health and safety’, or Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) is often used by 
people and organisations to mainly address (occupational) safety concerns (Leka et al., 
2016); their attention to work-related health and wellbeing is often limited to hazards and 
associated risks that stem, like safety risks, predominantly from technology related aspects 
of production processes, such as the design of technical installations and workplaces. Often 
there is less organisational and systematic attention paid to health compared to safety, 
while psychosocial risks and well-being at work often remain out of scope (Bergh et al., 
2014a; Leka et al., 2015). It is not known to what degree this bias towards safety is also 
found in companies that have committed themselves to ZH, which in principle seems to 
include health. The impression however, is that many ZH companies that already have 
developed a high degree of risk control in the area of safety, still have much to gain in the 
areas of health and well-being.  
 
In this paper the Vision Zero for health, safety and wellbeing is based on the assumption that 
all accidents, harm and work-related diseases are preventable. VZ for HSW is then the 
ambition and commitment to create and ensure safe and healthy work and to prevent all 
accidents, harm and work-related diseases in order to achieve excellence in HSW. VZ should 
be understood as a journey, a process towards the ideal, which is usually expressed in the 
terms ‘zero accidents’ (for safety only) or ZH (ideally for safety, health and wellbeing). VZ is 
also a value-based vision implying that work should not negatively affect workers’ HSW, and 
if possible, should help them maintain or improve their HSW and develop their self-
confidence, competences and employability.  
 
The call for more research into ZAV (Zwetsloot et al., 2013a) generated enthusiasm and was 
followed up by the publication of some empirical research, but also raised criticism. As there 
are many similarities between ZAV and VZ, part of the criticism explicitly refers to the 
broader concept of ZH. We will therefore first provide a concise overview and evaluation of 
raised criticism.  
 2. Criticism of the Zero Accident Vision and Zero Harm 
Several critical papers on ZAV or ZH have been published since 2013. The main criticisms are: 
(1) that ZAV is unrealistic and naïve, and denies the realities of risk (implying uncertainties, 
human limitation, and learning by mistake, Long 2012, Sharman 2014); (2) ZAV leads to more 
bureaucratic safety systems and bureaucratic accountability (Dekker, 2014 a, b, d); and (3) 
ZAV leads to a focus on very minor risks (Sharman, 2014), associated with overspending of 
investigation resources (Dekker, 2014b). The critics also state that ZAV leads to a safety 
culture of scepticism, cynicism, underreporting, lack of debate, fear of openness, a non-
learning climate (Long, 2012), intolerance (Sharman, 2014), stigmatisation of workers 
involved in incidents (Dekker, 2014b), and a punitive mind-set (Long, 2012). According to the 
critics, the focus in ZAV is on attaining zero injury rates, which may lead to underreporting 
(Sharman, 2014), and trickery and fraud with numbers (Dekker et al., 2015; Dekker and 
Pitzer, 2015; Dekker, 2014b). For a more in-depth overview, see Zwetsloot et al. (2017a). 
 
According to Zwetsloot et al. (2017a), part of the criticism seems to be based on the 
assumption that ZAV committed companies are trying harder to do the same old safety 
things, i.e. to make more safety procedures (systems associated with greater bureaucracy), 
and to be stricter and more punitive towards unsafe behaviour. If that assumption is right, 
the critics are right. But this is not what the empirical studies of VZ committed companies 
published so far confirm (Young, 2012; Twaalfhoven and Kortleven, 2016; Zwetsloot et al., 
2017b). 
 
The critics assume that ZAV (or ZH) companies have only three options to realise their 
ambition: stricter control through (bureaucratic) procedures, stricter behavioural control (or 
error prevention), and fraud with numbers (Dekker 2014 a, c, Long 2012, Sharman 2014). In 
reality, the limited empirical research into ZAV/VZ companies clarified that these companies 
realise that ZAV is based on a different mind-set, requiring a long-term process, and that 
healthy organisations make use of a wide range of traditional and innovative options to 
facilitate the ZAV process (Zwetsloot et al., 2017 a, b). For instance, developing a 
‘commitment strategy’ for safety, integrating it into business development, using 
technological and social innovations, developing a learning safety culture, etc. 
 
ZAV committed companies explored innovative ways to improve safety (see also Young, 
2014), and endeavoured to develop a learning-driven safety culture. Instead of stricter 
control and more sanctions towards unsafe behaviour, there was more empowerment than 
in other safety frontrunner firms. Managers asked questions in order to trigger reflection 
and dialogue, instead of giving orders and referring to existing procedures (Zwetsloot et al., 
2017 a, b).  
 The empirical results so far show that ZAV implementation often leads to significant safety 
improvements (e.g. Young., 2014; Zwetsloot et al., 2017a), thereby being keen to make use 
of technical and social innovations (Young, 2014). Companies and their personnel see ZAV as 
a journey driven by genuine long-term commitment (Young, 2014; Twaalfhoven and 
Kortleven, 2016; Koivupalo, 2015; Zwetsloot et al., 2017a) that does not lead to more 
bureaucracy. Instead, it leads to higher worker commitment and more empowerment 
(Zwetsloot et al., 2017b), to managers giving safety very high priority in daily practice, to the 
encouragement of participation and learning, and a culture that has more characteristics of 
a ‘just culture’ than is found in non-ZAV frontrunner firms (Zwetsloot et al., 2017b).  
 
In any case, criticism should not overshadow the many good practices found in the empirical 
studies so far. All in all, an evaluation of the criticism published so far underlines the earlier 
Zwetsloot et al. (2013a) call for more research into the industrial practice of ZAV (or ZH) 
implementation. 
 
It is to be noted that the critics of ZAV and ZH seem to have a very strong bias towards 
safety. In fact in their publications, ZH is almost equal to zero accidents (e.g. Dekker 2014, a, 
b, c; Long, 2012). They assume that the only reason for adopting zero accidents or harm is to 
reduce loss time incidents (LTI’s) to zero (they see it as a goal, not as a process), which is a 
very limited interpretation of ZH. In addition, they have not seriously addressed the 
ambitions in the areas of health and wellbeing. 
 
The critics might be particularly negative about VZ, as they focus only on the unproductive 
impacts of approaches that are based on a misunderstanding of VZ. However, the criticisms 
they offer are helpful for understanding the pitfalls of VZ when applied incorrectly. Table 1 
provides an overview of some potential pitfalls for companies that strive to achieve zero 
accidents. 
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Table 1: Pitfalls when considering Vision Zero  
Vision Zero used inappropriately Vision Zero used appropriately 
Applying Vision Zero as a target and making 
people accountable for realising it (perhaps 
even strengthened by economic incentives) 
It is a process that requires commitment 
from all leaders and workers in an 
organisation 
Focusing strongly on incident rates (and 
other lagging indicators) 
Using leading indicators 
Assuming that more safety rules, 
management systems and behavioural 
control will help to go from good to 
excellent safety performance 
Focus on leadership, being innovative and 
promoting (collective and individual) 
learning 
Assuming that one approach is able to 
improve different types of safety (e.g. 
process and personal safety) 
Using a variety of approaches and adapting 
them where appropriate  
 
We consider ZAV and ZH companies as companies that are ‘innovating’ their approaches 
with the intention to achieve excellence in safety or in HSW. This paper will therefore discuss 
the consequences of a genuine commitment to ZH for developing an integrated, balanced 
approach to HSW at work, realising synergies in HSW.  
 
3. Vision Zero for health, safety and wellbeing at work  
HSW at work are often parallel silos both in organisational practice, and in research 
communities. There are different foci that have emerged in the various silos, as well as 
several frequently found misunderstandings which hinder mutual understanding and 
cooperation in these key areas. Safety experts tend to regard psychosocial risks (let alone 
positive psychology) as not very relevant for safety, and as a ‘very soft’ area with a lack of 
hard evidence. A topic like ‘personal resources’ (an important area in the Job Demands and 
Resources model referring to self-efficacy, self-esteem and optimism) is likely to be 
associated by safety experts with the ‘accident prone’ theory (referring to personal 
characteristics in general) (Dahlbäck, 1991), which goes back to 1926, but which still remains 
controversial (Burnham, 2009). See also Christian et al. (2009) for a good meta-analysis of 
the role of personal factors in workplace safety.  
 
Experts in well-being at work tend to think that safety is a ‘hard’, technology dominated 
area, where simple ‘mono-causal’ factors lead to incidents (wellbeing being multi-causal). 
However, many safety experts nowadays focus strongly on safety culture and/or safety 
climate (e.g. Griffin et al., 2016; Leitão et al., 2016; Petitta et al., 2017; Zohar, 2014), and on 
interventions to improve safety awareness and organisational and behavioural change, 
subjects that are certainly not ‘hard’ nor ‘mono-causal’. 
 
It is important to note that ZH implies the control (or reduction) of occupational risks 
stemming from different types of hazards. Safety hazards stem mainly from energy intensive 
processes or products that imply the potential of acute liberation of energy injuring people 
and damaging the work environment, or they stem from the potential of loss of containment 
of (acute) toxic materials. Traditional occupational health hazards stem from various 
(chronic) exposures to physical, chemical and biological agents, as well to physical strain and 
the burden of unfavourable postures, movements, etc. Psychosocial hazards stem from work 
organisation or negative interpersonal interactions. Although there are many 
interrelationships between these various types of hazards, the different types of hazards 
require also different methods for risk assessment and different types of control measures. 
This is also true within the safety domain, as we now know that a focus on prevention of 
personal risks does not help to reduce process safety risks (Baker, 2007), and a focus on 
minor personal safety risks does not automatically help reduce severe personal risks 
(Mendeloff and Burns, 2013).  
 
While the focus in the area of psychosocial risks, or positively formulated wellbeing at work, 
is strongly on work organisation and interpersonal interactions, in the area of safety there is 
little empirical evidence regarding work organisation (some exceptions are Parker et al., 
2001; Laschinger et al., 2006). The psychological perspective on safety seems to be 
dominated by (safe and unsafe) behaviour and safety culture/climate. While in the area of 
wellbeing growing attention has been placed on the importance of organisational culture 
(see for example Dollard and Bakker, 2010; Dollard, 2007; Zwetsloot and Leka, 2010). 
 
3.1 Commonalities of safety and wellbeing 
Safety and wellbeing likely have more in common than many would expect. In both areas, 
design and management challenges are important. The control of deviations in work 
processes is a shared interest. There are many similarities between the promotion of health 
and wellbeing and safety promotion. Business ethics are relevant for safety and for 
wellbeing, with many recent challenges, e.g. the impact of globalisation on the (changing) 
workplace, the impacts of continuous cost reductions, and the focus on core activities and 
outsourcing of all non-core activities. Positive psychology is not only relevant for ‘work 
engagement’, but is also likely to be relevant for safety promotion (Nahrgang et al., 2012; 
Mathisen & Bergh, 2016). In the safety domain, the increasing attention to the concept of 
‘resilience’ has also led to a positive safety concept ‘Safety 2’ (Hollnagel, 2014). In the area of 
resilience engineering there is now a growing interest in how ‘resources’ help to master 
deviations (Grøtan et al., 2016). Other common bases for safety and wellbeing are: (1) 
control of (work) processes and dealing with deviations, (2) improving accuracy, avoiding 
human error, and (3) proactive approaches to new developments, including reorganisations 
and outsourcing, increasing flexibility, job insecurity etc..  
 
Fitness for the job is a concept that also bridges the two areas. The IAEA (2016) mentions 
‘fitness for duty’ as one of the areas relevant for safety culture. The physical and mental 
fitness of the workforce is key to alertness and risk awareness. Traditional aspects thereof 
concern the (non) use of alcohol and drugs, and fatigue, but increasingly this is seen in a 
broader perspective, paying also attention to the prevention of stress and burnout, and the 
promotion of healthy lifestyles.  
 
Interfaces between steps in the production process are often problematic in safety 
(potentially causing communication problems and control challenges); in socio-technical 
theories these are known to be a source of production problems (quality), and to be a source 
of stress. The socio-technical approach is therefore to reduce the division of labour as much 
as possible, preferring simple organisations with complex jobs, over complex organisations 
with simple jobs. See Grote and Kunzler (1996, 2000) for socio-technical approaches to 
safety. 
 
From the perspective of credibility for the employees the two areas (safety and wellbeing) 
are also closely associated. Credibility, taking care of the safety of people also implies, often 
implicitly, taking care of their health, and vice versa. The different traditions and foci imply 
complementarities and opportunities for synergies. Several concepts and models that have 
been developed and are based on considerable evidence in one area, also seem relevant for 
the other area, e.g. on job design and work organisation (wellbeing) (e.g. Leka et al. 2008) 
versus management systems, increasing risk awareness and safety culture (Edwards et al., 
2013; Clarke, 2006). This is also evident in the content of developed standards like OHSAS 
(BSI, 2007) that focuses on OSH management systems, and PAS1010 (BSI, 2011) that focuses 
on the management of psychosocial risks in the workplace. 
 
While safety experts focus on the organisational level for psychosocial aspects of safety 
(safety culture and climate), psychosocial experts in the areas of health and wellbeing at 
work focus on work organisation, job content, demands and resources. These different 
traditions seem highly complementary and suggest a potential for important synergies. 
 
 
3.2 Fatigue and safety 
Irregular working hours and over-time work may result in chronic fatigue, which can lead to 
decreased concentration and cognitive failure during work (Akerstedt et al., 2002; 
Williamson, 2011). Dembe et al. (2005) report an increase in occurrence of occupational 
accidents by 23% among employees working at least 60 hours per week. Lamond and 
Dawson (1999) showed that that moderate levels of fatigue may produce performance 
impairment equivalent to or greater than those observed at levels of alcohol intoxication 
deemed unacceptable when driving, working and/or operating dangerous equipment. 
According to Chan (2011) fatigue is the most critical accident risk factor in oil and gas 
construction.  
 
3.3 Stress and safety 
Flin et al. (2008) described how stress can impact workers’ performance negatively in terms 
of efficiency and accuracy, and it has also been associated with lower levels of work situation 
awareness for drilling personnel on oil and gas installations (Sneddon et al., 2013). Mathisen 
and Bergh (2016) found a positive association between emotional exhaustion and action 
errors/violations, and a negative relationship between engagement and action 
errors/violations.  
 
Stress has been linked with poor sleep quality, excessive drinking, feeling depressed, feeling 
anxious, jittery, inattentive behaviour, which may result in momentarily distraction, human 
error and/or failure in normal activities (Leka & Jain, 2010; Mearns et al., 2001). Larsson 
(2003) saw another synergy: according to him prevention of accidents and injuries is also an 
important strategy to prevent post-traumatic stress. 
 
Mearns et al. (2001) showed that the variable most likely to predict accidents and near 
misses on an oil installation is 'unsafe work practices'. The number one predictor of 'unsafe 
work practices' was employees having a perception of 'high production pressure'. It was the 
feeling of stress that contributed to performance issues in safety-critical operations. Stress 
as a result of high production pressure was directly related to work practices. It is therefore 
easy to see a correlation between being stressed as a result of perceived production 
pressures and making critical errors at work.  
 
Goldenhar et al.  (2003) showed a correlation between several stressors (e.g. job demands, 
job control, job uncertainty, training, exposure hours, and job tenure) and safe work 
practices in construction, and Glasscock et al. (2006) found similar results in farming. Bergh 
et al. (2014b) found a correlation between psychosocial risk factors and hydrocarbon leaks 
on offshore platforms, whereas Ramvi (2003) showed a correlation between the quality of 
the psychosocial work environment and commitment to safety at work at two different oil 
installations in the North Sea. 
 
3.4 Work organisation and safety 
Given the relevance of stress (prevention) for safety, it is not surprising that there is also 
considerable evidence that work organisation factors are important for safety. Deviations in 
production process are known to be a potential trigger for the causation of accidents. In 
psychosocial research, deviations are regarded as ‘demands’ on the worker to deal with 
(requiring sufficient autonomy / decision latitude) (e.g. Karasek, 1979; Bergh et al., 2016). 
Actions to prevent accidents go hand in hand with making operations more reliable, which 
also have an impact on workers’ health and well-being. 
 
The relevance of work organisation factors for safety are also addressed in several accident 
investigation models and methods. For example, the TRIPOD methodology of incident 
investigation (Groeneweg, 1994) comprises ‘error enforcing conditions’ as one of the eleven 
basic risk factors that can underlie many accidents. The great body of knowledge on the 
importance of decision latitude (autonomy), social support etc. that is available in the area 
of psychosocial risk management, has now also been proven to be relevant for safety (e.g. to 
reduce human error, etc.). A meta-analysis by Nahrgang et al. (2011) showed that job 
demands and resources relate to safety outcomes. 
 
4. Broadening the six innovative perspectives 
The application of presently available (evidence based) methods and tools can help most 
companies to realise important steps towards genuine Zero. However, VZ is also paradoxical, 
and it will also require organisations to explore and identify new paths. In the 2nd ZAV 
discussion paper (Zwetsloot et al., 2017a), an important discussion is centred on a table that 
clarifies six innovative perspectives for ZAV. This Table can be adapted to VZ perspectives 
promoting ZH broadly, encompassing HSW. Table 2 is a first attempt towards this 
perspective.  
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Table 2: Zero Harm for health, safety and wellbeing - six innovative perspectives (elaborating 
on Zwetsloot et al., 2017a) 
 
ZAV Theme Traditional safety  
approach 
(accident prevention) 
Zero Accident Vision 
 
Zero Harm for health, 
safety and wellbeing 
(HSW) 
Commitment 
strategy 
Safety control strategy Safety commitment strategy HSW is a long-term 
commitment strategy 
Safety is a priority Safety is a value HSW is a value 
Safety (0 accidents) is 
an (unrealistic) goal 
Safety is a process, a journey HSW is a process, a journey 
Safety and health are in 
practice two distinct 
worlds 
Safety and health are 
ethically and practically 
closely interconnected 
Safety, health and wellbeing 
are ethically and practically 
closely interconnected 
A way of 
doing 
business 
Safety improvements 
stem from safety 
programs 
Safety is an integrated part 
of doing business  
HSW is an integrated part of 
doing business  
Safety is mainly a 
tactical and operational 
challenge 
Safety is a strategic 
challenge 
HSW is a strategic challenge 
Risk management Safety leadership and 
business excellence 
HSW leadership and 
business excellence 
Safety is perceived as a 
cost factor 
Safety is perceived as an 
investment  
HSW is perceived as a long-
term investment  
Safety is only relevant 
internally (and for the 
authorities) 
Safety is also relevant for 
business partners and 
external stakeholders 
HSW is also relevant for 
business partners and 
external stakeholders 
Innovation The workplace is more 
or less a static 
environment wherein 
safety management will 
lead to continuous 
improvement 
The workplace is a dynamic 
environment wherein 
technological and social 
innovations are important for 
significant improvements in 
safety 
The workplace is a dynamic 
environment wherein 
technological and social 
innovations are important for 
significant improvements in 
HSW 
Prevention 
culture 
Preventing accidents Creating safety Creating safety, health and 
well-being at work 
Compliance – ‘We have 
to’ (external motivation) 
Participation - ‘We want to’ 
(intrinsic motivation) 
Participation - ‘We want to’ 
(intrinsic motivation) 
Incidents are failures Incidents are opportunities 
for learning 
HSW events (incidents, 
cases) are opportunities for 
learning 
Safe behaviour is 
desirable 
Safe behaviour is the norm HSW promoting behaviour 
is the norm 
Workers’ behaviour 
(human error) are part 
of the problem 
Workers are empowered to 
come up with solutions – 
they are part of the solution 
Workers are empowered to 
come up with solutions – 
they are part of the solution 
Safety is designed or 
prescribed by experts 
Safety is co-created by 
experts and all members of 
the organisation (having a 
questioning and learning 
approach) 
HSW is co-created by 
experts and all members of 
the organisation (having a 
questioning and learning 
approach) 
Focus on management 
systems 
Focus on culture and 
learning 
Focus on culture and 
learning 
Safety culture is 
important 
Safety culture and ‘just’ 
culture are important 
HSW promoting a ‘just’ 
culture are important 
Focus on accident 
prevention 
Focus on accident prevention 
and safety promotion  
Focus on prevention and the 
promotion of HSW in work 
and life 
Ethics and 
CSR 
Safety management is 
always rational  
Safety management is 
rational but also founded on 
ethics 
HSW leadership is rational 
but also founded on ethics 
Safety is associated with 
prescriptions, paper 
work, and owned only 
by a few champions 
Safety is inspiring, ‘alive’ 
and ‘owned’ by all members 
of the organisation 
HSW is inspiring, ‘alive’ 
and ‘owned’ by all members 
of the organisation 
Transactional leadership Transformational leadership Transformational leadership 
also paying attention to job 
demands and resources 
Safety policy implicitly 
based on values 
Safety policy explicitly based 
on values 
HSW policy explicitly based 
on values 
Networking 
and co-
creation 
Safety improvement is 
triggered by internal 
processes (Plan, Do, 
Check, Act) 
Safety improvement is 
triggered also by learning 
from the experiences of 
others in and outside the 
organisation 
HSW improvement is 
triggered also by learning 
from the experiences of 
others in and outside the 
organisation 
Benchmarking on 
lagging indicators (like 
injury rates) 
Benchmarking on leading 
indicators and good practices 
Benchmarking on leading 
indicators and good practices 
Safety improvement is 
triggered by best 
practices in the sector 
Safety improvement is 
triggered by adopting and 
adapting good practices from 
other (ZAV) organisations 
HSW improvement is 
triggered by adopting or 
adapting good practices from 
other (VZ) organisations and 
and sectors sectors  
 
 
The six innovative perspectives included in Table 2 can be further explored making use of 
several relevant concepts and theories. An overview thereof is provided in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Vision Zero for health, safety and well-being - six innovative perspectives and associated 
concepts and theories  
The innovative perspectives Relevant concepts and theories Selection of key eferences 
A commitment strategy Commitment strategy for high 
performance 
Beer 2009 
 
Intrinsic motivation and self-
determination theory 
Ryan & Deci 2000  
Deci & Ryan 2008 
A way of doing business Goal setting theory Locke & Latham 2002 
Transformational leadership Barling et al. 2002 
Mainstreaming OSH EU OSHA 2010 
Innovation Workplace innovation 
 
Eeckelaert et al. 2012 
Oeij et al. (in press, 2017) 
Resilience Engineering Hollnagel et al. 2006 
High Reliability Organisation Roberts 1990  
Weick & Sutcliffe 2007 
Inherently Safer Production Zwetsloot & Ashford 2003 
Innovation diffusion theory Rogers 1993 
Prevention culture Prevention culture  Eichendorf & Bollmann 
2014; Salminen 2015: 2nd 
Strategy Conference 2011; 
WSH 2012 
Ethics and CSR Institutional theory Powell & Di Maggio 1991 
Normative management Bleicher 2009 
Non-traditional stakeholders Jain et al. 2011 
Networking and co-creation Network organisations and 
learning 
Knight 2002 
 
Organisational learning and 
system improvement 
Senge 1990 
Soft systems methodology Checkland & Poulter 2006 
Co-creation Payne et al. 2009; Prahalad 
& Ramaswamy 2004 
 
5. Keeping the Vision Zero spirit alive 
There are several challenges and strategies for keeping the spirit of VZ alive. Here we will 
focus on three specific clusters of challenges. 
 
1) The first of these is the impact of globalisation and the changing world of work (ILO, 2016; 
James, 2006). More specifically, the global financial situation stemming from around 2008 
implies that cost reduction is a dominant factor, leading to a trend towards higher 
workloads, smaller HSW margins, growing job insecurity (causing stress but also less 
ownership and commitment to HSW) and challenges in the production chain (with 
contractors etc.). 
 
The changing world of work also implies a range of other general challenges to the area of 
HSW. There is growing diversity with workforce migration, often implying different cultural 
backgrounds, languages and cultures. In addition, work teams are often changing rapidly due 
to contingent work. At the same time, there are generational gaps between young and older 
workers. This diversity can have severe implications for communication, education and 
training, cooperation, culture, and for dealing with personal vulnerabilities. In addition, it 
implies new forms of risk to worker HSW that impact on company sustainability (EU-OSHA, 
2015). It is therefore important the companies commit to a wider VZ that includes these 
emerging priorities. 
 
2) An additional ongoing challenge is reaching and engaging the many small and medium-
sized enterprises that often do not have a long-term vision or policy in HSW. Larger VZ 
committed companies can play an important role in this respect by increasing the general 
business attention to HSW, and by motivating and supporting smaller enterprises that are 
their suppliers, contractors, customers or neighbours to commit to HSW goals. As VZ 
companies are highly ambitious, they are likely to recognise these generic challenges at an 
early stage, and to deal with them seriously and effectively. This is another reason why 
research into the practices of VZ companies is interesting and important. 
 
3) Mainstreaming into business management is the third important challenge. The VZ 
message needs to go beyond individual HSW company departments, from the HSW 
community (including HSW policy makers) to business leaders. It is important in this respect 
to keep in mind that ZAV and ZH are usually part of a broader ‘family of Vision Zero’, e.g. 
zero defects, zero waste and traffic accidents, etc. (Zwetsloot et al., 2013, 2017a). Seeing 
ZAV, ZH and VZ in a broader setting was suggested also as an explanation for why ZAV was 
more easily accepted in industrial practice than in the safety science community (Zwetsloot 
et al., 2013a). These broader ‘zero visions’ often go beyond aspects of internal organisation, 
and may include the development of new products and services, e.g. Volvo and General 
Motors both claim to work on the development of ‘zero crash cars’, and they see it as a 
marketing incentive to work safe and produce safe products (Avila and Hosford, 2012; Volvo, 
2017). 
 
Singh (2012), an important business analyst, sees the broader VZ perspective, which he calls 
‘innovating to zero’, as one of the ten Mega Trends that will impact business and society 
globally in the coming decade. Singh emphasises the innovative nature of VZ, its close 
relationship with running business, and describes it as a journey generating many 
opportunities along the way to creating and ensuring safety. 
 
“The most remarkable feature of this Mega vision is that the ultimate opportunity lies not in 
attaining the actual goal itself, but in capitalising on the opportunities that would lead to it 
……. It also needs a strong culture from people within that ecosystem” (Sing, 2012, p. 59). 
 
Clearly, this implies several challenges not only for the industry, but also for the HSW 
community at large. 
 
6. Developing a full Zero Harm culture 
Genuine commitment to zero accidents or harm is a value laden commitment that has many 
implications for organisational culture. In the safety literature there continues to be a lot of 
attention to safety culture and climate and safety leadership (Petitta et al., 2017; Leitão et 
al., 2016; Clarke, 2013 and 2006), and there is growing attention to safety as a value 
(Ratilainen et al., 2016; Cooper, 2001). In the area of health and well-being there is a 
growing interest in organisational values, culture and leadership (e.g. NICE, 2015). 
 
Organisations increasingly define core values to give meaning to the companies’ existence 
and their value for society. When core values are more than a public relations instrument, 
they are important for the identity, and cohesion of organisations. Core values have the 
potential to guide the practices and behaviours of managers, supervisors, and workers.  
 
From this perspective it is logical that there is growing attention to values that support 
safety (Ratilainen et al., 2016), and to the value of HSW. Again there are several values that 
are supportive of HSW (Zwetsloot et al., 2013b). In their broad literature review, Zwetsloot 
et al. (2013b) identified seven core values that are supportive to HSW, which could be 
clustered into three groups: 1) a value cluster characterized by a positive attitude towards 
people and their ‘being’ (comprising the core values of interconnectedness, participation 
and trust); 2) a value cluster relevant for organizational and individual ‘doing’ (comprising 
justice and responsibility); and 3) a value cluster relevant for ‘becoming’ which is 
characterized by the alignment of personal and organizational development (comprising the 
values of growth and resilience). 
 
However, values can have a broader meaning related to work as well: values for doing 
‘meaningful’ work (Milliman et al., 2003), and for being inspired, motivated and engaged 
through alignment of individual and organizational goals (Beer, 2009). These broader values 
also imply the development of a positive organisational culture, beyond safety culture. Olsen 
et al. (2015) showed that a positive organisational climate (broader than safety climate) can 
also be relevant for safety on oil platforms. 
 
Another challenge is the development and maintenance of a ‘learning driven culture’ for 
HSW (e.g. IAEA, 2016). This implies a learning attitude of management and workers, as well 
as a transition from ‘We must work safe and healthy’ to ‘We want to work safe and healthy’ 
(intrinsic motivation; Ryan and Deci, 2000). 
 
One model that moves towards this more holistic HSW understanding is the ‘Total Worker 
Health’ approach which focuses on policies, programs and practices that integrate both 
‘protection’ from OSH hazards and ‘promotion’ of injury and illness prevention in furthering 
wellbeing for a globally competitive workforce (Schill and Chosewood, 2013). A review of 
Total Worker Health interventions has shown preliminary and promising results of the 
integration of HSW promotion activities (Anger et al., 2015). 
 
7. Conclusion 
There is a steadily growing attention in industry for VZ in terms of a long term commitment 
process to strive for Zero Accidents and/or ZH. In most organisations the attention for safety 
is dominant, while health and wellbeing at work still receive much less attention. VZ should 
be regarded as a holistic vision, wherein health, safety and wellbeing at work are all 
addressed, and synergies between these areas are recognised and utilised. There is already 
sufficient evidence to state that fatigue, stress, and work organisation factors in general are 
important determinants of safety behaviour and performance. The broadening of ZAV to a 
ZH vision wherein wellbeing is addressed seriously is therefore an important challenge for 
many industries. The integration into business development and the development of a 
broader ZH culture (or prevention culture) are important challenges for VZ committed 
companies. There is a clear need for empirical research into this challenging area.  
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